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Kaylie Gioioso* 
 
Small Companies, Big Breaches: Why Current Data 
Protection Laws Fail American Consumers in Cases 
of Third-Party Hacking 
 
The number of data breaches resulting in stolen consumer identities continues 
to soar in the United States as businesses increase their online presences.1 Small 
businesses have been particularly and disproportionately impacted.2 Hackers are 
increasingly attacking smaller vendors with weak security systems as entry points 
into the systems of large corporations, a phenomenon known as third-party 
hacking.3 Current laws, which require only that reasonable security measures in 
light of a company’s size, offer little consumer protection from these third-party 
breaches.4 Lawmakers could better serve American consumers by deferring to state 
law regimes. Individual states should pass laws that focus on comprehensive data 
security and give states’ attorney generals broad enforcement power.5 Part I of this 
comment discusses the general background surrounding data breaches, part II 
discusses the current legal landscape, part III analyzes the efficacy of the 
reasonableness standard, and finally, part IV suggests ways in which data breach 
laws can be improved upon moving forward. 
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 1. See infra Section I.A. 
 2. See infra Section I.B. 
 3. See infra Section I.D. 
 4. See infra Section II.A. 
 5. See infra Section IV. 
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I.  Background 
A typical day in the life of an American consumer is increasingly conducted online. 
Grocery orders, retail purchases, entertainment consumption, employment 
searches, and even romantic interactions are just a few of the many ways in which 
consumers transact online. The convenience that accompanies these online services 
necessarily translates into the online sharing of personal information with the 
companies that facilitate the transactions, which in turn results in the increased 
theft of personal information through data breaches.6 A data breach is defined as 
“an incident in which an individual name plus a Social Security number, driver’s 
license number, medical record, or financial record” is put at risk.7 
A.  Data breaches are an increasingly pressing threat to American consumers’ privacy. 
Data breaches present a bigger threat to American consumers’ privacy than ever 
before.  Robert Mueller, former director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
recently warned that “there are only two types of companies: those that have been 
hacked and those that will be.”8 A staggering number of U.S. companies have been 
the victims of data breaches, resulting in the theft of millions of consumers’ 
personal data.9 For example, since 2005, approximately 675 million personal 
records have been exposed due to data breaches.10 In 2014, the number of U.S. data 
breaches reached an all-time high of 783 reported incidents,11 representing a 27.5% 
increase since 2013.12 Although not all data breaches result in identity theft,13 
criminal attacks (as opposed to system glitches or negligence) are by far the most 
frequent causes of data breaches, representing 44% of all reported incidents.14 
As the sheer number of attacks has increased, so has the cost for both the 
individual companies and consumers. For companies, from 2013 to 2014, the 
 
 6. How the Desire for Increased Convenience is Having an Impact on Privacy, MCCUNEWRIGHT, LLP, (Dec. 
14, 2015), http://mccunewright.com/how-the-desire-for-increased-convenience-is-having-an-impact-on-
privacy/. 
 7. Data Breaches, IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., http://www.idtheftcenter.org/id-theft/data-breaches.html. 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2016). 
 8. Douglas H. Meal, Private Data Security Breach Litigation in the U.S., ASPATORE 1, 1 (2014), 
https://www.ropesgray.com/~/media/Files/articles/2014/February/Meal%20Chapter.ahx. 
 9. See Identity Theft Resource Center Breach Report Hits Record High in 2014, IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 
(Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.idtheftcenter.org/ITRC-Surveys-Studies/2014databreaches.html. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. (noting that this number is a safe estimate, as many data breaches “fly under the radar” and go 
unreported). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. 2014 Cost of Data Breach Study: U.S., PONEMON INST. RESEARCH REPORT 1, 9 (May 2014) 
http://www-935.ibm.com/services/multimedia/SEL03027USEN_Poneman_2014_Cost_of_Data_Breach_Study.
pdf. System glitches represent 25 percent of data breaches while negligence represents 31 percent of data 
breaches. Id. 
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average cost of an organizational data breach increased from $5.4 million to $5.9 
million.15 The cost per individual record16 stolen per breach increased from $188 to 
$201.17 The average cost of lost business due to a breach increased by 15% to $3.5 
million.18 In total, data breaches cost the American economy approximately one 
billion dollars annually.19 
For individuals, the cost of having their personal information compromised 
varies depending on what information is stolen, and how quickly the theft is 
discovered.20 Financial costs can range anywhere from $50 to several thousand 
dollars,21 but the emotional harms suffered can be far costlier.22 In a survey by the 
Identity Theft Resource Center, victims of identity theft reported feeling vulnerable, 
helpless, betrayed, and embarrassed, in addition to losing sleep and their general 
peace of mind.23 Victims described having their credit history destroyed and having 
to pay much higher interest rates on any new credit cards, as well as spending 
countless hours trying to undo the damage caused by the hackers.24 
While multimillion-dollar companies suffer the highest dollar losses, and 
individuals suffer the greatest emotional harm, a third category of entities affected 
by data breaches is often overlooked.25 
B.  Data breaches have a significant negative impact on small businesses. 
As the number of data breaches has continued to increase, perhaps no group has 
been more severely impacted than small businesses.26 Cybersecurity firm Symantec 
has reported significant increases in cyberattacks on small businesses over the past 
 
 15. Id. at 6. 
 16. A record is any personal information associated with one person. Id. at 3. 
 17. Id. at 5. 
 18. Id. at 1. 
 19. Steve Viuker, Cybercrime and Hacking are Even Bigger Worries for Small Business Owners, THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2015, 3:18 P.M.), http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jan/21/cybersecurity-small-
business-thwarting-hackers-obama-cameron. 
 20. Kimberly Rotter, The Staggering Costs of Identity Theft in the U.S., CREDIT SESAME (Jun. 19, 2014), 
http://www.creditsesame.com/blog/staggering-costs-of-identity-theft/. 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Herb Weisbaum, ID Theft Can Take Heavy Emotional Toll on Victims, TODAY (Nov. 20, 2014, 12:11 
P.M.), http://www.today.com/money/id-theft-can-take-heavy-emotional-toll-victims-1D80305639. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Infra Section I.B. 
 26. Parija Kavilanz, Cybercrime’s Easiest Prey: Small Businesses, CNN MONEY (Apr. 23, 2013, 4:00 p.m.), 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/04/22/smallbusiness/small-business-cybercrime/. According the Small Business 
Association, the definition of a small business depends on the industry in which                                                 
the company operates. Table of Small Business Size Standards, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ASSOCIATION 
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/files/Size_Standards_Table.pdf, (last visited Dec. 2, 2015). However, a 
small business consists of no more than 500 employees and an average annual receipt of less than 15 million 
dollars. See id. 
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several years,27 with the number of attacks on these companies increasing 300% 
from 2011 to 2012.28 Similarly, the National Cyber Security Alliance recently 
reported that out of over one billion attempted cyberattacks prevented by Symantec 
in 2012,29 almost 40% specifically targeted small businesses.30 Additionally, one in 
five small businesses is a victim of a cyberattack every year.31 Even more worrisome 
is the fact that about 60% of these companies go out of business within six months 
after being hacked,32 as each breach costs small businesses thousands of dollars on 
average,33 a hit many of the companies cannot survive.34 
The stories surrounding these attacks on small companies all sound eerily 
similar. For example, take the story of the cyber attack on specialty T-Shirt 
company 80sTees.35  A credit card company notified the owner of the store that 
some customers were complaining of mystery charges.36 80sTees promptly ceased 
collecting customers’ credit card information, had the matter investigated by its 
own expert and reported the incident to the federal government.37 However, the 
investigation yielded no evidence of an intrusion to the system, and 80sTees 
continued business as usual.38 Flash forward several months and credit card 
complaints later, and the company’s fears were confirmed.39 Their system had in 
fact been hacked at the time of the original complaint, and thousands of customers’ 
data was stolen.40 The company was forced to stop collecting credit card data from 
customers for four months while it developed a new website and implemented new 
internal safety measures, suffering major revenue losses along the way. 41 
 
 27. Small Firms Cybersecurity Guidance, SIFMA 1, 3 (July 2014), 
https://www.sifma.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=8589949972. 
 28. John Brandon, Why Your Business Might be a Perfect Target for Hackers, INC. (Jan. 2014), 
http://www.inc.com/magazine/201312/john-brandon/hackers-target-small-business.html. 
 29. New Survey Shows U.S. Small Business Owners Not Concerned About Cybersecurity, NAT’L CYBER SEC. 
ALL., https://staysafeonline.org/about-us/news/new-survey-shows-us-small-business-owners-not-concerned-
about-cybersecurity, (last visited Feb. 23, 2016). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Robert Strohmeyer, Hackers Put a Bull’s-Eye on Small Business, PCWORLD (Aug. 12, 2013, 3:30 AM), 
http://www.pcworld.com/article/2046300/hackers-put-a-bulls-eye-on-small-business.html. 
 32. Id. 
 33. E. Scott Reckard & Tiffany Hsu, Small Business at High Risk for Data Breach, LA TIMES (July 4, 2014, 
5:07 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-small-data-breaches-20140705-story.html#page=1. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Jonathon Berr, A Fast-Growing Threat to Small Businesses: Hackers, CNBC (Sept. 8, 2014, 10:33 AM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101971980. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.; see also Reckard, supra note 33. 
 41. See Reckard, supra note 33. 
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A California-based small business, Rosenthal Wine Bar and Patio, suffered a 
similar fate when it discovered malware42 on its computer systems and was unable 
to identify how long the hackers had been collecting its customers’ data.43 After 
properly notifying its consumers, “the reaction was immediate.”44 Many customers 
cancelled their memberships and the company received scathing reviews on Yelp.45 
The company felt as though it had lost much of the good will it had worked so hard 
to establish in its community.46 These effects are often fatal to small businesses, 
resulting in over half of the victim companies going out of business less than a year 
after an attack.47 
C.  Small businesses have many characteristics that render them particularly attractive 
to hackers. 
Most small businesses have common characteristics that leave them particularly 
exposed to the threat of cyberattacks and attractive to hackers.48 First, small 
businesses often have relatively weak security measures in place.49 Small businesses 
typically “lack an IT department and tend not to be as diligent as larger companies 
about security.”50 Additionally, small companies are doing more and more business 
“via cloud services that don’t use strong encryption technology.”51 Finally, owners 
of small businesses may lack the funds or the time to invest in more stringent 
security measures.52 
Small businesses are also vulnerable because they “don’t know what they don’t 
know.”53 In other words, they are unaware of what cyberattacks look like or what 
types of online activities are risky.54 For example, a “perfectly normal-looking e-mail 
from a friend’s computer that was attacked without the owner’s knowledge could 
lead to trouble.”55 Similarly, many owners of small businesses falsely believe that 
 
 42. Malware is defined as “software programs designed to damage or do other unwanted actions on a 
computer system.” Malware Definition, TECH TERMS, http://techterms.com/definition/malware (last visited Feb. 
25, 2016). 
 43. Reckard, supra note 33. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Graham Winfrey, Can Your Company Survive a Cyber Attack?, INC. (Dec. 5, 2014), 
http://www.inc.com/graham-winfrey/how-to-protect-your-company-information-in-the-digital-age.html. 
 48. Brandon, supra note 28. 
 49. Berr, supra note 35. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Brandon, supra note 28. 
 52. Associated Press, Hacking a Big Danger for Small Business, SF GATE  (Oct. 11, 2014, 8:09 PM), 
http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Hacking-a-big-danger-for-small-businesses-5817263.php. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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they would never be the targets of an attack because they do not collect nearly as 
much data as the Fortune-500 firms, and therefore fail to adequately protect 
themselves.56 The weaker security systems that result from the combination of these 
factors “translate into reams of sensitive data behind a door with an easy lock to 
pick” for experienced hackers.57 
D.  Hackers are using small business hacks as entry points for hacking larger 
corporations. 
The relatively weak security systems of small businesses present opportunistic 
hackers with a way to access the systems and data of larger companies,58 an 
occurrence referred to as collateral, or third-party, hacking.59 The exact mechanisms 
used by hackers vary, but the general idea is as follows. First, a hacker gains access to 
a weakly protected online system of a small business.60 Second, the hacker uses this 
access as an entry point to a larger company that is connected in some way to the 
small firm,61 often as a supplier or contracting party.62 A perfect example of this 
phenomenon is the widely publicized data breach of major retailer Target in 2013.63 
Hackers first infiltrated a heating, ventilation, and air conditioning company that 
had contracted with Target, used “that access to gain a foothold on an internal 
system and then use[d] that to leapfrog to other systems inside Target’s network.”64 
Similarly, millions of Home Depot customers had their data stolen when hackers 
accessed the improvement store’s network by using a vendor’s stolen log-on 
credentials in order to “install custom-built malware that stole customer payment-
card data and e-mail addresses.”65 
 
 56. Geoffrey A. Fowler & Ben Worthen, Hackers Shift Attacks to Small Firms, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 21, 2011). 
 57. Brandon, supra note 26. 
 58. Fowler, supra note 56. 
 59. Collateral hacking is “when a company’s critical data is compromised as a result of a third party in 
possession of the company’s sensitive data being hacked. Rather than directly hacking into a company, collateral 
hackers go through a third party in order to get to the company’s sensitive data.” What is the Definitition of 
Collateral Hacking, GLOB. MKT., http://wiki.globalmarket.com/what-is-the-definition-of-collateral-hacking-
24691.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2016). 
 60. See Jaikumar Vijaya, Hackers Hit More Businesses Through Remote Access Accounts, COMPUTERWORLD, 
(Jul. 2, 2014, 8:48 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2491431/security0/hackers-hit-more-
businesses-through-remote-access-accounts.html (describing how hackers recently gained access to several U.S. 
restaurants through third-party vendors.). 
 61. Brandon, supra note 28 (“If [a small business has] any Fortune 500 companies as customers, you’re an 
even more enticing target—you’re an entry point.”). 
 62. See Vijaya, supra note 60. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Michael Winter, Home Depot Hackers Used Vendor Log-On to Steal Data, E-mails, USA TODAY,             
(Nov. 7, 2014, 8:57 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/11/06/home-depot-hackers-
stolen-data/18613167/. 
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Reports of third-party attacks like these are becoming more and more 
common.66 Furthermore, these third-party hacks occur against the background of a 
legal framework that is largely failing to protect American consumers, as discussed 
in Sections III and IV.67 
II.  Legal Background 
Federal laws primarily focus on the reasonableness of a company’s data security 
plan in light of that company’s size. Additionally, federal laws remain primarily 
focused on highly regulated industries, like finance and healthcare. The Federal 
Trade Commission retains the power to regulate consumer-based industries, but 
has largely refrained from doing so. State laws similarly focus on the reasonableness 
of a company’s data protection plan. 
A.  Federal laws are largely focused on highly regulated industries and the 
reasonableness of a company’s data protection plans. 
The federal government currently enforces a handful of laws related to data 
security.68 These laws do not concern most private corporations,69 but rather address 
data breaches almost exclusively in: (i) discreet, highly regulated industries, like 
financial services, consumer reporting, or healthcare,70 or (ii) specific government 
agencies, like the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs.71 For breaches in the private 
sector, the few applicable federal laws focus primarily on the reasonableness of the 
company’s security system.72 
i.  Federal laws on cyber security focus primarily on large companies in highly regulated 
industries. 
The most prominent federal data breach laws focus on specific, highly regulated 
industries.73 The Financial Services Modernization Act, commonly referred to as the 
Gramm-Leach-Billey Act,74 regulates the financial services industry’s collection of 
 
 66. Vijaya, supra note 60. 
 67. See infra Sections III–IV. 
 68. Jessica Rich, Data Security: Why It’s Important, What the FTC is Doing About It (Mar. 24, 2014), 2014 
WL 1309704 1, 2 (F.T.C.). 
 69. State laws generally regulate private corporations. See infra Section II.B. 
 70. Rich, supra note 68, at 3. 
 71. See 38 U.S.C. § 5723 (2012). 
 72. See infra Section II.A.iii. 
 73. Rich, supra note 68, at 3. 
 74. 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012). 
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consumer data.75 Gramm-Leach-Billey requires financial institutions to “develop 
procedures for protecting the security of customer data” and empowers several 
government agencies to enforce the relevant regulations.76 One section of the 
Gramm-Leach-Billey Act, referred to as the Safeguards Rule, imposes regulations on 
non-bank financial institutions, and allows the FTC to take law-enforcement action 
against companies that are not in compliance with the data security requirements.77 
Similarly, federal laws regulate data collection in the credit-reporting and 
healthcare industries.78 The Fair Credit Reporting Act mandates that credit-
reporting agencies only disclose private consumer information to entities which 
have a “permissible purpose” for requesting data, and additionally “imposes safe 
disposal obligations” on companies that receive such data.79  The healthcare and 
health insurance industries are regulated by the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accounting Act, which aims to protect consumer privacy by establishing 
nationwide security and use standards for institutions that collect individual 
medical records and personal health information.80 
ii.  Federal laws also regulate cyber security for government agencies. 
The federal government has also enacted data breach laws in its own agencies.81 The 
Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) “establishes a framework 
designed to ensure the effectiveness of security controls over information resources 
that support federal operations and assets.”82 Agencies including the Department of 
Veterans Affairs,83 and the Department of Education are responsible for developing 
and implementing their own security and risk management procedures.84 The 
 
 75. Office of the Attorney Gen., Financial Privacy: The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, STATE OF IDAHO, 
http://www.ag.idaho.gov/consumerProtection/generalTopics/topicSubPages/financialPrivacy.html (last visited 
Dec. 2, 2015). 
 76. Paul M. Schwartz, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 920 (2007). 
 77. Rich, supra note, 68 at 3. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936 (Aug. 
21, 1996). 
 81. Information Security: Federal Agencies Need to Enhance Responses to Data Breaches: Testimony Before the 
Comm. On Homeland Sec. and Govt. Affairs, U.S. Sen. 1, 5 (Apr. 2, 2014) (testimony of Gregory C. Wilshusen, 
Director of Information Security Issues), http://gao.gov/assets/670/662227.pdf. 
 82. Id.; Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, H.R. §§ 3541–3549 (2002). 
 83. See supra Section II.A. 
 84. Wilshusen, supra note 81, at 7 (stating that the 24 major agencies that have partially or fully 
implemented data security procedures are as follows: “the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, 
Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Housing and Urban Development, the 
Interior, Justice, Labor, State, Transportation, the Treasury, and Veterans Affairs; the Environmental Protection 
Agency, General Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Science 
Foundation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Personnel Management, Small Business 
Administration, Social Security Administration, and U.S. Agency for International Development.”). 
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Federal Trade Commission oversees the implementation of FISMA, but the 
individual agencies are largely left to their own discretion in choosing security 
measures.85 
iii.  The Federal Government has the option to regulate private industry and small 
companies under the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, but has largely chosen not 
to do so. 
Lastly, the FTC has the power to regulate the collection of personal information by 
national retail corporations outside of the highly regulated financial and healthcare 
industries.86 The FTC enforces laws regarding consumer data security under Section 
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914.87 However, the protection that this 
law offers is limited in scope, as it only enables the FTC to act in cases of unfair or 
deceptive practices by a company in relation to its data security measures.88 
In a recent statement, the Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection for the 
FTC, Jessica Rich, described the FTC’s general approach toward data security.89 She 
explained that: 
The touchstone of the FTC’s approach to data security, under whatever law 
we are applying, is reasonableness: a company’s data security measures 
must be reasonable in light of the sensitivity and volume of consumer 
information it holds, the size and complexity of its data operations, and the 
cost of available tools to improve security and reduce vulnerabilities.90 
This approach allows for the consideration of several factors, including: whether 
the risk of breach was obvious or foreseeable, the relative costs and benefits of 
additional security measures, and the current availability of protective tools on the 
market.91 
Companies are accordingly only required to take “reasonable” steps to ensure 
consumer privacy but the FTC does not provide specific, tailored requirements, so 
“[t]here is more than a fair amount of leeway for entities in deciding what data 
security measures to take.”92 Under this standard, the FTC has only pursued 
 
 85. Id. at 5. 
 86. See Rich, supra note, 68 at 3–4. 
 87. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).  
 88. Rich, supra note, 68 at 3–4. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 4. 
 91. Protecting Consumer Info.: Can Data Breaches Be Prevented?: Hearing Before the Comm. On Energy & 
Commerce & Subcomm. On Commerce, Mfg., & Trade 1, 4 (Feb. 5, 2014), (statement of Edith Ramirez, 
Chairwoman of the FTC), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/prepared-statement-
federal-trade-commission-protecting-consumer-information-can-data-breaches-be/140205databreaches.pdf.  
 92. Paul M. Schwartz, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913, 922 (Mar. 2007). 
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approximately fifty cases for violations under this law in the thirteen years since 
2001.93 Compared to the thousands of disclosed incidents of data breach during this 
same time, the FTC’s number of actions seems miniscule.94 
B.  The state and local legal environments are similarly aimed at large companies, 
requiring only reasonable security measures in relation to a company’s size. 
Consumer information protection laws for retail and non-financial services 
companies are primarily enacted and enforced on the state level.95 State statutes, in 
addition to common law tort principles, govern cases involving data breaches.96 
California led the nation in enacting data breach legislation when it passed the 
statute S.B. 1386 in 2003.97 Many other states went on to enact similar legislation, 
basing their respective statutes on California’s model.98 California’s statute and 
many of the subsequent statutes modeled after California’s largely have one thing in 
common with the federal data breach laws:99 the statutes require only “reasonable” 
security measures in light of a company’s size and capabilities.100 
For example, Maryland’s Personal Information Protection Act provides that: 
a business that owns or licenses personal information of an individual 
residing in the State shall implement and maintain reasonable security 
procedures and practices that are appropriate to the nature of the personal 
information owned or licensed and the nature and size of the business and 
its operations.101 
The Maryland legislature did not specifically detail what qualifies as “reasonable” 
for any given size company in the Act, but chose instead to leave this vague 
 
 93. Ramirez, supra note 91, at 4. 
 94. Robert D. Brownstone, 1 DATA SEC. & PRIVACY LAW § 9:101 (2014), Chapter 9: Privacy Litigation. 
 95. Schwartz, supra note 92 at 915. Forty-six states, plus the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and 
the Virgin Islands, have enacted data breach notification legislation. The only four states that have not enacted 
such legislation are Alabama, Kentucky, New Mexico, and South Dakota. Brownstone, supra note 94. 
 96. Schwartz, supra note 99 at 923. 
 97. Id. at 915; CAL. CIV. CODE § § 1798.29, .82, .84 (West 2006). 
 98. Schwartz, supra note 92 at 915. 
 99. Supra Section II.A. 
 100. For example, California’s statute provides that: “A business that owns or licenses personal information 
about a California resident shall implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and practices 
appropriate to the nature of the information, to protect the personal information from unauthorized access, 
destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.” CAL. CIV. CODE § § 1798.81.5(b) (West 2006) (emphasis added). 
Maryland’s statute adds the requirement that the security procedures be reasonable in light of the “nature and 
size of the business and its operations.” MD CODE ANN., COM. LAW, § 14-3503(a) (West 2013). 
 101. MD CODE ANN., COM. LAW, § 14-3503(a) (West 2013). Other states with a reasonable requirement 
include Arkansas, California, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington.                        
See Mintz Levin, LLC, State Data Security Breach Notification Laws, MINTZ (Jan. 1, 2015), 
https://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2007/PrivSec-DataBreachLaws-02-07/state_data_breach_matrix.pdf. 
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requirement up to interpretation.102 The logical presumption follows, then, that 
security measures considered “reasonable” for a small company would not be 
considered as such for a larger, multi-state corporation. Small companies can legally 
have “small” security measures in place. 
III.  Analysis of Data Security Under the Reasonableness Standard 
Upon first glance, the reasonableness requirement directed at big companies makes 
sense. Larger corporations have more consumers, and thus more data, to protect.  
However, closer inspection reveals that the vague reasonableness standard, without 
any additional safeguards, is failing American consumers.103 Hackers gain easier 
access to small companies’ weakly (but still “reasonably,” in light of their size) 
protected systems and use this access as a gateway to the larger companies’ 
databases.104 The reasonableness requirement in both federal and state laws, as 
currently applied, fails to protect America’s consumers from having their personal 
information stolen.105 
A reasonable data protection plan for a small business might look something like 
the following: first, the company should train its employees in basic data security 
practices, like strong passwords and Internet use guidelines.106 Second, the company 
may install basic antivirus software107 and scan the software after any updates to 
detect any new viruses,108 as well as provide a basic firewall109 for Internet 
connections.110 Finally, the small company may control physical access to 
computers, limit employee access to customer information files, and make backup 
copies of important data.111 Again, none of these security measures are specified or 
currently required by law,112 but instead constitute what would likely be considered 
a reasonable system under federal and state data protection laws.113 
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On the other hand, a standard, reasonable data protection plan for a large 
corporation is predictably far more complex.114 A reasonable “big data” 115 plan 
might involve additional precautions that supplement the protective measures 
described above.116 First, the company should implement an organization-wide, in-
depth security strategy for dealing with suspected and confirmed breaches.117 This 
includes logging every “access and manipulation of” data by all employees;118 the log 
must then be “audited regularly (on a weekly or less period), and ideally the logs 
should be automatically monitored by anomaly detection systems for inappropriate 
usage and unexpected patterns.”119 Second, the company should install automatic 
scanning systems that constantly monitor120 the network for vulnerabilities.121 Third, 
big data companies should encrypt122 individual data records stored in their 
networks.123 Finally, companies may wish to establish a hotline to provide company 
personnel with immediate access to pre-approved data breach attorneys, experts, 
and/or an information technology support team so that suspicious activities can 
immediately be reported and evaluated in order to determine the level of response it 
warrants.124 These additional precautions likely constitute a reasonable security 
system for a big data company. 
Under the applicable federal and state laws,125 both security systems described 
above would likely be considered reasonable by state courts or the FTC.126 The 
hypothetical small business presumably has fewer resources and a lower volume of 
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consumer data,127 which means it can have a far less sophisticated security system in 
place and remain in compliance with all relevant laws.128 The hypothetical “big data” 
company has more resources and collects more consumer records, so it must 
maintain a higher-level data protection plan in order to comply with the 
reasonableness standard under the law.129 
This discrepancy seems “reasonable” upon first glance, but upon closer 
examination reveals a glaring loophole which hackers can and have exploited to the 
detriment of American consumers.130 Even the most sophisticated of hackers would 
find it easier and more efficient to attack the weaker security system of the small 
businesses.131 This does not present a huge problem initially, as the small business 
has a relatively small amount of private data that would be compromised.132 The 
issue becomes a much larger one, literally and figuratively, if that small business 
contracts with a big data company and has insider, password-protected access to the 
larger company’s network.133 The small company acts as a “gateway” to the larger 
company and allows hackers easier access than if they attacked the big data 
company from the start.134 The hack and data breach of big data companies occur 
because of the lower security requirements for these smaller companies, exposing 
millions of consumers’ personal data that would otherwise be protected, but for 
these smaller companies’ weaker security systems. Injured consumers, however, are 
left without recourse, because both companies’ security systems are in compliance 
with the law, as they are reasonable for their respective sizes.135 
The reasonableness requirement based on the size of the company, without any 
additional security requirements, is failing our country’s consumers. As noted 
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earlier, multiple data breaches of huge, household name companies have occurred 
because hackers gained access to small company contractors first.136 In the Target 
breach, hackers infiltrated the retailer by first attacking an HVAC company and 
using the contractor’s credentials to access Target’s network.137 Seventy million 
customers had their names, addresses, emails, and phone numbers stolen; another 
forty million also lost credit card numbers.138 In another massive attack, hackers 
used a third-party vendor’s log-in information to penetrate Home-Depot’s 
network.139 Fifty-six million Americans’ credit card numbers were compromised.140 
Similarly, Goodwill suffered a massive breach when a hacker attacked a third-party 
credit-card processing vendor and subsequently obtained access to Goodwill 
customers’ credit card information.141 Debit and credit card information of 868,000 
customers was stolen.142 
Stories like these are becoming more and more frequent, and the applicable laws 
are becoming less and less adequate. In most incidences of third-party hacking, 
both companies’ security systems are in compliance with the law,143 but wholly fail 
to protect consumers. Consumers are left without recourse and the law provides no 
incentive for companies to make meaningful changes.144 The time has come for the 
vague reasonableness standard to be supplemented with stricter, data protective 
state laws.145 
IV.  Recommended Changes 
Many suggestions have been put forth as to how to best handle the growing number 
of data breaches in this country.146 These suggestions range from reliance on tort 
theories of strict liability147 to legislation requiring companies to implement a strict, 
standardized set of security measures.148 One possible solution that has gained 
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ground in recent years is the call for a national federal law that would preempt state 
data protection laws.149 This suggestion is misguided, however, as it could undo the 
strides that several states have taken in passing relatively strict data breach 
legislation.150 Instead, Congress should defer to individual states, which should in 
turn: (1) pass data protection laws that rely on comprehensive best practices 
approaches; and (2) give states’ attorney generals broad enforcement authority.151 
This approach provides companies with more explicit guidelines than a vague 
reasonableness standard alone, and therefore better protects American consumers 
from the growing problem of third-party hacking. 
A.  The call for a national federal data breach law is a misguided suggestion that would 
ultimately harm American consumers. 
Recently, there has been a push for Congress to adopt a nationwide data breach law 
that would preempt existing state laws.152 Industry groups argue that mismatched 
and inconsistent state laws make it difficult for companies to know whether they are 
complying with the law in any given state at any given time.153 One industry expert 
argued that the “myriad of conflicting state laws, as well as the lack of one over-
arching federal law, creates legal and compliance nightmares for companies that 
these breaches affect.”154 Even President Obama recently called for a national 
standardized data breach law in a speech to the FTC.155 In his speech, the President 
referenced the argument that the various state laws cause consumers and companies 
alike great confusion, and urged business leaders and privacy advocates to push for 
the passing of a national standardized law.156 
This suggestion for a federal data breach law is misguided for two reasons. First, 
the argument that the myriad of state laws confuses companies is simply not true. 
In our national economy today, most companies conduct business across state 
borders.157 In order to avoid confusion associated with compliance with various 
state data breach laws, companies typically end up complying with the strictest set 
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of state laws.158 This way, they are likely also compliant with the less strict state laws, 
and are able to avoid potential confusion across state lines.159 A federal law would 
likely not rise to the level of the strictest state laws, and therefore could very likely 
represent a step backward in protecting American consumers.160 
The call for a federal data protection law is also misguided due to the ever-
changing nature of technology. Technological advances related to data security 
occur so quickly that a federal law with standardized protection requirements could 
become obsolete in a matter of months, if not sooner.161 Congress is ill-suited to 
quickly respond to these changes. States and their attorney generals, on the other 
hand, are often better suited to adopt legislation that is tailored to the changing 
technological landscape more effectively.162 
B.  The approach best suited to protect American consumers’ data is a state law regime 
that takes a comprehensive approach to data security and gives states’ attorney generals 
broad enforcement power. 
Federal lawmakers should forego a national data breach law and instead defer to 
state laws, which should in turn implement a comprehensive approach to data 
security that give states’ attorney generals broad enforcement powers. In 
comparison to federal lawmakers, state legislatures are better equipped to quickly 
adapt to changing technological climates. This would reduce the likelihood that 
laws would become and remain obsolete. 
i.  Comprehensive Approach to Data Security 
A key factor in a state law regime that could reduce the likelihood of obsolescence is 
a comprehensive approach to data security. As opposed to a set of specific 
technological standards, a broader, comprehensive approach has a better chance of 
retaining relevance over time while providing clearer guidelines than a vague 
reasonableness standard.163 The Massachusetts data protection law164 serves as an 
excellent example. As discussed above, federal laws and many state laws require 
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only reasonable security measures.165 The Massachusetts law takes things a step 
further with a comprehensive approach that imposes stricter requirements on 
companies that collect consumer data.166 While this law still uses a reasonableness 
standard, it is much more explicit as to what “reasonable” means.167 
Specifically, the Massachusetts law requires any entity that collects personal 
information168 of a Massachusetts resident to “implement a written information 
security program (‘WISP’) with appropriate administrative, technical, and physical 
safeguards.”169 Each WISP must include the following best practices: 
1. The designation of at least one employee to maintain the WISP; 
2. The assessment of risks to the security of records containing personal 
information, and improvement of safeguards to mitigate such risks, 
including employee training and detection and prevention of security 
system failures; 
3. Disciplinary measures for violations of the WISP and safeguards for 
preventing terminated employees from accessing records containing 
personal information; 
4. The development of security policies for the storage, access, and 
transportation of records containing personal information outside of 
business premises; 
5. The implementation of reasonable restrictions upon physical access to 
records containing personal information, and the storage of such records 
and data in locked facilities, storage areas, or containers; 
6. Monitoring the WISP’s effectiveness in preventing unauthorized access to 
or use of personal information; 
7. The review of the scope of the security measures at least annually or 
whenever there is a material change in business practices that may 
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reasonably affect the security or integrity of records containing personal 
information; and 
8. The documentation of responsive actions to any security breach incidents 
and of post-incident review of events and actions taken to change business 
practices.170 
Each WISP must also include a computer security program with “minimum 
standards for information security protocols.”171 Most significant of these standards 
is the duty to encrypt personal data,172 which renders the information unreadable to 
those without use of confidential access.173 
In addition to the WISP, the Massachusetts law requires companies to limit the 
amount of personal information that they collect. The collected information must 
be reasonably tailored to “accomplish the legitimate purpose for which it is 
collected.”174 Similarly, the companies must limit the amount of time that this 
information is stored to what is reasonably necessary.175 
Furthermore, the Massachusetts law specifically addresses the issue of 
contracting with third-party service providers.176 The statute requires that service 
providers be contractually bound to protect their systems on a basis consistent with 
the rest of the statute.177 Therefore, even if a third-party service provider does not 
necessarily collect personal information itself, it is required to maintain a WISP and 
other security measures if it contracts with a company that does collect personal 
information.178 
The Massachusetts law provides companies with clear guidelines as to what is 
considered “reasonable.” In this way, it rises above current federal data protection 
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laws and should be used as a model moving forward in protecting American 
consumers from data breaches and more specifically, third-party hacking. 
ii.  Attorney General Enforcement Power 
Finally, Massachusetts gives its attorney general broad power to enforce the state’s 
data protection law.179 “Actions for injunctive relief and civil penalties of not more 
than $5,000 per violation (plus the reasonable costs of investigation and litigation) 
may be brought for any violations of the regulation.”180 The attorney general, as 
opposed to the FTC, is best suited to bring these enforcement actions. As one 
assistant attorney general put it, unlike the FTC, “(s)tate attorneys general hear 
directly from the residents they serve on a daily basis.”181 The same assistant 
attorney general went on to argue that a pre-emptive federal law “could place a 
wedge between consumers and the very state agencies that serve them.”182 Attorney 
generals are in the best position to enforce data protection laws and should be given 
broad power to do so. 
V.  Conclusion 
Current federal data breach laws that focus primarily on the reasonableness of a 
company’s security measures in light of its size are failing American consumers.183 
The vastly different data security plans of small and large companies are usually 
considered legal under the vague reasonableness standard.184 This becomes an issue 
in third-party hacks, where hackers use weakly protected small businesses to 
infiltrate larger companies.185 Using the Massachusetts data law as an example, states 
should pass more comprehensive data protection statutes.186 These statutes must go 
beyond the reasonableness standard in providing clear guidelines as to what is 
expected of companies that collect consumer data, regardless of size, and give state 
attorney generals broad enforcement power if these expectations are not met.187 In 
doing so, these state laws will be better suited to protect American consumers from 
having their personal information stolen as a result of third-party hackers. 
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